Current focus in the health care ethics literature on the character of the practitioner has a reputable pedigree. Rather than offer a staple diet ofAristotelian ethics in the undergraduate curricula, perhaps instead one should follow Murdoch 's suggestion and help the practitioner to develop vision and moral imagination, because this has a practical rather than a theoretical aim. ' The imaginative capacity of the practitioner plays an important part in both the quality of the nurse's role enactment and the moral strategies which the nurse uses. It also plays a central part in the practitioner's ability to communicate with a patient and in the type ofperson which the practitioner becomes.
Introduction
A current interest in both nursing and medical literature is the character of the health care practitioner and its influence on the type of care which the practitioner provides for patients or clients.2 Considerations of character move one into the domain of moral discourse. In speaking about the moral dimensions of both nursing and medical practice one needs to consider issues of role enactment and moral strategy.3 The importance of these concepts was articulated by Downie in the 1960s within the wider social context.4 These issues are also directly related to the type of care which the practitioner provides for patients or clients, and to the character of the practitioner. Moral strategy refers to when and how we go about doing something of moral relevance; for example when and how a patient is asked to participate in a clinical trial. Role enactment refers to those qualities which an individual brings to his or her functioning in a role. These qualities are elements of the character and are thus not reducible to aspects of the role.
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When one wishes to consider characteristics of the practitioner, particularly those related to the issues of role enactment and moral strategy, one is talking of virtue in the Aristotelian sense of the word.5 A further element which is needed when one considers role enactment and moral strategy is that of an active moral imagination. This is because the type of "agent-attention"6 which is needed for high-quality role enactment and sensitive moral strategy presupposes activity of the moral imagination.
It is difficult to describe adequately what the moral imagination is. For our present purposes, I suggest that moral imagination is that aspect of the imagination which potentially becomes active in the moral agent's attempt to consider what moral decisions to make: that human faculty which allows "gut-reaction" to be used and moderated into the perceptual schema and which enables the moral agent to build up a multi-dimensional understanding of a situation -including a reasonably complex understanding of the situation of the actors involved. This faculty comprises three elemental influences: reason, gut-response and something akin to Humean fancy.
I suggest that it is at least partially activity of the moral imagination which allows the sensitive nurse or doctor, for example, to perceive the non-verbal cues and attend to patients sufficiently to know when the patient is capable of coping with bad news, rather than merely stating such news in a cold, factual way, without any attempt to consider if the time is ripe. Respecting patient autonomy is important. However, given the vulnerability which illness brings, so also is a consideration of the particular situation of the individual patient. This process of consideration of the particular situation is facilitated by an active moral imagination. Imagination, what is its relevance?
An analysis of the concept of imagination is beyond the remit of this paper. Some clarification of that aspect of imagination which is of concern in this paper may be achieved by stating that it is not the grosser perceptual aspects of imagination which are of interest in this instance, but a fine tuning of the imagination. The former aspects of imagination are discussed in depth by Hume," Kant 12 and Wamock 13 for example. Imagination, in Wamock's words, "bridges the gap between sensory data and intelligible thought". ' 3 Evidently it is not this type of survival imagination which appears to be lacking in the health care practitioner who strips a patient naked in public or who carries on a teaching round while an old lady tries to use a bed pan. '4 It is possible to argue that in this sort of situation the fine tuning of the imagination may be missing. By "fine tuning" is meant that aspect of the imagination which allows the nurse to perceive, in this particular patient, personhood; that aspect of the imagination which allows the practitioner to believe not only in the continuous existence of this particular patient, but which allows her to believe that here exists a human being: "a person such as I". This is the aspect of the imagination which in the words of Henry James allows one to be "finely aware and richly responsible". '5 It seems that it is something like this type of imagination which Murdoch refers to as the "moral imagination". 16 
Moral paralysis
One may ask at this point why this type of imagination appears to be important for the health care practitioner. Are practitioners not too busy trying to get on with their jobs to have time to worry about being "finely aware and richly responsible"? Inherent in this kind of criticism may be the very real fear experienced by some teachers of health care ethics that too much concentration on imagination and imaginatively identifying with patients may induce a moral and professional paralysis.
My reply is as follows: if health care professionals are willing to take upon themselves ultimate responsibility for decisions that can have a profound impact on the lives of their patients, then it is vital that these same practitioners clearly understand the possible or likely implications of their decisions from within the psychosocial context of the patient, rather than simply consider the medical implications. Therefore practitioners have a duty actively to engage with their patients at a level which will allow the practitioners to gain insight into the patients' lives in order to get a clearer perception of the likely implications of decision A or treatment B.
I suggest that this engagement only comes through activity of the moral imagination. This activity of the moral imagination is not a floundering at the level of uneducated emotion; which can indeed lead to paralysis, or perhaps the many incidences of burnout which one sees referenced in the literature. It is instead the activity of a faculty which has been nurtured and developed in the practitioner. A faculty akin, I suggest, to an intellectual virtue in Aristotle's sense of the term5; or more particularly a faculty directly relevant to the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis. It is this close connection with phronesis which leads to my suggestion above that the faculty of the moral imagination is in fact a composite faculty.
I would wish to argue that activity of the moral imagination is central to issues of moral strategy, role enactment and the personal characteristic of compassion. It is therefore at least indirectly related to the quality of health care which members of the general public receive. 2 3 If this is so then educating the moral imagination is an important function of the education of a health care practitioner.
It is impossible to achieve much of the understanding which compassion requires without, to some extent, entering imaginatively into the world of the person who is the patient. For example it is not possible to understand the meaning or impact which breast cancer has for this thirty-six-year-old woman unless the practitioner also learns of and takes into consideration the fact that this young woman has five small children and an alcoholic husband. This allows the practitioner imaginatively to identify with this woman from within the context provided by this extra information.
Again a major coronary is a serious condition for any patient to face; the implications of this condition for Mr Jones cannot be more than glimpsed at unless it is also known that he is a widower who is responsible for the welfare of a son with uncontrolled epilepsy and Korsakoff s amnesia.
It may be suggested that though these extra bits of a patient's social history may be useful to know they are not vital. I suggest that possibly the only time in a patient's treatment that such information is not directly relevant to his treatment programme is in situations of life or death. For example during cardiac resuscitation the only really relevant information is "is the heart beating?" and "is the patient breathing?" If a patient is not responding to treatment, or is not responding as well as expected, or if he is refusing to take any treatment, apparently irrelevant bits of his social history may provide the answer to the problem. ( The potential for this type of scenario to befall the practitioner should be recognised more widely than it would appear to be at present. This problem has certainly been identified in sociological literature. It is occasionally described as an undesirable aspect of the process of professional socialisation for a number of practitioners. This potential for the desiccation of personality to occur seems to provide another reason for supporting the development of the practitioner's moral imagination. If the practitioner can imaginatively identify with a particular patient during certain trying situations the focus of the practitioner's attention is on the patient rather than on himself and his own particular needs (conscious or unconscious). Therefore, the practitioner's practice is patientcentred and in that sense patient-directed or patientfocused, rather than practitioner-centred or practitioner-focused. This (To achieve this is one of the major aims of a moral education such as many nurses and others may well not have had)."
Griffin's suggestion that many nurses may not receive the relevant type of education (moral education) to allow them to perceive accurately and understand the needs of their patients should provide food for thought for those of us who try to teach ethics to nurses (and other health care practitioners). This seems to raise the following questions: "what are educators attempting to do, when they try to teach ethics to health care practitioners?" "What is the goal?" "Why is the teaching of ethics seen as a good idea, or in more and more instances a necessary part of the curriculum?" The answer which I offer is that ethics is taught in an attempt to help the student become a better practitioner; better in the sense of more humane, more compassionate, more caring towards the persons who are the practitioner's patients.
Can the moral imagination be stimulated and nurtured?
"The claim seems to be that if you really vividly experience a concrete human life, imagine what it's like to live that life, and at the same time permit yourself the full range of emotional responses to that concrete life, you will (if you have at all a good moral start) be unable to do certain things to that person. Vividness leads to tenderness, imagination to compassion. The patient effort to see moderates the coarseness of which political horror is made." 20 The notion of "a good moral start", bracketed in the above quote from Nussbaum, is of course crucial here. It is an Aristotelian idea and is supportive of my idea of activity of the moral imagination being an intellectual virtue. The intellectual virtues, in an Aristotelian framework, are built upon a foundation of moral virtues, the existence of which depends on "a good moral start".5 This suggests that attempts to educate the moral imagination come secondary to the need to consider the character of entrants to the health care professions. This is perhaps an idea that has been highlighted by the Allitt Inquiry.2' The point being that attempts to stimulate, develop and educate the moral imagination will "fall on stony ground" unless it is viewed as an element in the developing character of the practitioner.
In the literature there is a growing school of thought which suggests that the answer to the question "can the moral imagination be stimulated and nurtured?" is a resounding "yes". The theory is that the moral imagination can be stimulated and nurtured through the use of the humanities, perhaps particularly the serious reading of literature; especially certain types of novels. Nussbaum An answer to the first concern is not easy, but must be rooted in an acceptance of certain ideals of clinical practice which are based on explicit articulation of the core concepts of practice: such as "care" and "treatment". The answer is also directly related to an identification of dispositions of character which are seen to be desirable in the practitioner.
In answer to the second problem Nussbaum concentrates on the novel as a means of moral education. Many educators in the medical humanities use also, or exclusively, contemporary short stories, drama, poetry (Coles, 27 Trautmann,23 and Downie.25 I suggest there are advantages in using a mixture of texts, and a mixture of media -both printed and visual. Use of novels and film has the advantage of historical perspective, and lengthy descriptions of context and character. They are also good sources for developing history-taking skills in students -an idea which exercised Kleinman.'7 However, within the realities of a crowded curriculum one must be realistic in one's expectations of students. Poetry and short stories can often focus the mind sharply and effectively on an issue of concern.
The development of a syllabus is not my intention here. However, there is a growing variety of help in the literature, for teachers of health care ethics who wish seriously to consider the suggestions in this paper and to attempt to act upon them (for example'7 20 23 24 25 27) A point that is worth making, I think, is that it is useful to become reasonably familiar with the second level curriculum in that it will give the teacher of medical or nursing humanities some insight into which texts our students will, initially, find accessible.
Murdoch advises focusing on certain works of art, and there is evidence of this being considered in medical and nursing education.25 This may be very useful for those who find art accessible. However, literature has two advantages in this area: firstly most of our students will have been exposed to literature until midway through their secondary education, if not afterwards. Therefore one is not working from scratch in this area. Secondly literature will provide first-order and also second-order concepts with which to enrich the language and thought processes of our students. In a context where there is growing subsumption of the language of the market place into the thinking, writing and policy-making about health care practice, I suggest that this is not an unimportant consideration. Language influences thought28 29 7) and it is difficult to see how verbal thought does not affect the boundaries of imaginative activity
Conclusion
From what is being argued above it seems to be the case that moral imagination is important to the quality of a practitioner's role enactment, the moral strategies which the practitioner uses and the practitioner's ability to communicate with patients. The quality of care which a patient receives from a practitioner is not only to do with technical, clinical skills but also with the practitioner's ability to listen and communicate, as well as with the quality of the practitioner's role enactment and moral strategy. Therefore, it seems that an active moral imagination is important to the type of care which patients receive from health care practitioners.
It is further being suggested by many theorists that the moral imagination can be stimulated and nurtured through the humanities, particularly literature. If this is the case, a place should be made for the use of literature in the already crowded curriculum of medical and nursing students. This, of course, is not a new idea. However, I think that an attempt to link activity of the moral imagination directly to certain aspects of patient care is a significant factor in giving weight to the demand.
